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ABSTRACT
This study empirically evaluates the certification and value-added roles of
reputable venture capitalists (VCs). Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial startups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers made by competing
VCs at the first professional round of start-up funding, holding characteristics of
the start-up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times
more likely to be accepted, and high-reputation VCs acquire start-up equity at a
10 to 14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs’ “extra-financial” value may
be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital. These
extra-financial services can have financial consequences.
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A central issue for early-stage high-tech entrepreneurs is obtaining external resources when the
assets of their start-up are intangible and knowledge-based. Particularly for entrepreneurs
without an established reputation, convincing external resource providers such as venture
capitalists to provide financial capital may be challenging. The literature contains two main lines
of research for overcoming this problem. One research stream has concentrated on designing
institutional structures to permit financing early stage ventures. This contractual- and
monitoring-based approach is aimed at solving potential agency problems between investors and
entrepreneurs (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Lerner (1995), Hellmann (1998), Kaplan and
Strömberg (2001, 2002, and 2003)). A second research stream has suggested that when the
quality of a start-up cannot be directly observed, external actors rely on the quality of the startup’s affiliates as a signal of the start-up’s own quality (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991),
Biglaiser (1993), and Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999)). This certification-based approach may
help legitimate start-ups and entrepreneurs without a prior track record.
While the first research stream emphasizes the venture capitalist’s problem (designing the
appropriate mechanisms), the second highlights the entrepreneur’s problem more directly
(affiliating with highly reputable partners), and serves as an antecedent to this study. VC
certification value, together with their value-added services such as recruiting executive
managers (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), have led analysts in the descriptive literature to write: “It
is far more important whose money you get [as an entrepreneur] than how much you get or how
much you pay for it” (Bygrave and Timmons (1992, p. 208)) and “From whom you raise capital
is often more important than the terms” (Sahlman (1997, p. 107)). These views clearly indicate
that VCs have different value-added potential and that venture capital represents more than strict
financial capital to entrepreneurs. In contrast, the extant academic literature has not emphasized
VC heterogeneity, implicitly treating VCs as one uniform class so that reputation differences
among VCs are obscured (see Gompers (1996) and Kaplan and Schoar (2003) for exceptions).
As well, whereas much of the previous literature has concentrated on the benefits to certification
(e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999)), the costs of
affiliating with prominent actors have not been systematically analyzed empirically. For
example, the prescriptive advice to start-up entrepreneurs of affiliating with the highest status
partner possible (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels) seems strong given that calculations of returns to
such action that do not take into account the costs of affiliation may be overstated. Indeed,

3

demand for affiliation with reputable actors is likely to vary with the cost of such association.
More generally, because affiliation with reputable partners confers performance benefits, such
association cannot be freely accessed, for otherwise certification agents would not have
incentives to invest in acquiring a reputation in the first place (Shapiro (1983)).1
Consequently, this article explores two interlinked questions: Is there a market for
affiliation with reputable partners? If so, what are the prices for such affiliation? Entrepreneurial
demand for affiliation with venture capitalists provides an excellent empirical setting to explore
these questions for two reasons. First, because VCs can certify and start-ups need to be certified,
the exchange nature of the relationship provides a natural marketplace for affiliation. Secondly,
due to the tremendous increase in the supply of venture capital in the second half of the 1990s,2
the situation of “money chasing deals” makes observing a menu of price offers by VCs with
varying reputation more likely—a necessary condition for identifying the market for affiliation.
The empirical analysis investigates proxies for VC reputation which explain the variation
in offers accepted and valuations offered to start-ups at a point in time, while holding start-up
characteristics fixed. To implement this methodology, I developed a novel, hand-collected
dataset of 148 financing offers (both those accepted and declined) made to a group of 51 early
stage high-tech start-ups. The estimated effects are both statistically and economically
significant. A financing offer from a high reputation VC is approximately three times more likely
to be accepted by an entrepreneur. As well, highly reputable VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10
to 14% discount.
The empirical results suggest that entrepreneurs are willing to forego offers with higher
valuations in order to affiliate with more reputable venture capitalists. These results are
consistent with the idea that venture capitalists act as more than strict financial intermediaries,
placing funds from investors to capital-constrained start-ups. If this were not the case, we might
expect entry by suppliers of entrepreneurial finance to equilibrate prices for start-up equity
across offers to a given firm. However, if VCs differed in the bundle of services and certification
they provide to their portfolio companies, which might be thought of as “extra-financial” VC
1

The extant research on the market for certification has only established general bounds. Statements on the supply
of certification have generally been limited to an acknowledgment that such suppliers will not want to provide
affiliation to entities that will damage their reputations (Podolny (1993)). Likewise, on the demand side, screening
theories would argue that only those organizations that will benefit most from certification will accept the terms of a
stringent supply contract (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg (2001, 2003)).
2
Disbursements to start-ups from VCs, which totaled just $665M in 1980 and $2.3B in 1990, skyrocketed to over
$100B in 2000 (National Venture Capital Association Yearbook (2001)).
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functions, then prices for affiliation might differ. This implies that the VC information network
and its certification value may be more distinctive than their financial capital, and so these extrafinancial VC functions can have financial consequences—namely, the price at which VCs are
able to acquire equity in a given start-up. Indeed, this view is consistent with the stylized fact
that VCs experience substantial inter-industry variation in financial performance (Kaplan and
Schoar (2003)). Consequently, future research exploring variation within the VC industry,
especially as it relates to organizational performance, would be interesting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses the relevant prior
literature and derives hypotheses about the entrepreneurial market for VC affiliation. Section II
describes the methodology and data used to test these hypotheses. Empirical results are discussed
in Section III, while a final section concludes with a discussion of the implications and
limitations of the study.

I. Literature and Hypothesis Development
This section starts with a discussion of reputation as an economic good, develops the
notion of a market for affiliation, and concludes with hypotheses about the demand for VC
affiliation by early stage start-ups.
A. Reputation and Affiliation as Economic Goods
Reputation, which results from prior experience and performance, has been identified as
an economically important asset that can generate future rents when information among actors is
asymmetric (e.g., Shapiro (1983) and Biglaiser (1993)). Starting with Spence (1974), there has
been a sizeable theoretical literature on the phenomenon of actors without an established
reputation signaling quality to the external market. For example, Bagwell and Bernheim (1996)
present a theory of Veblen effects in which people engage in conspicuous consumption because
material displays of relative wealth signal social status.
A related strand of research suggests that performance benefits can be realized by the
reputable producer’s affiliates through a process of certification. This phenomenon has been
examined in the context of reputable investment banks and venture capitalists and the pricing of
initial public offerings (Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Megginson and Weiss (1991)). These
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agents can credibly stake their reputations on the claim that the IPOs they back are not
overpriced as a result of their repeated interactions with external parties.
More generally, for a certification to be effective, it must fulfill three conditions: (1) The
certifying agent must have reputational capital at stake that would be compromised with an
invalid certification; (2) the certifying agent’s reputational capital must exceed the largest onetime wealth transfer from a mis-certification; and (3) the certified target must face a cost of
leasing the reputational capital of the certifying agent (Booth and Smith (1986)). This final
condition is an important one for insuring that the certifying agent would have the proper
incentives to invest in its own reputation. Unfortunately, it has not received much empirical
attention; consequently it is this market for “leasing” reputational capital (and the associated
prices for doing so) that forms the core of the empirical analysis in this paper.
Venture capitalists meet the three previously stated criteria of certifying agents and can
therefore be suppliers of certification (Megginson and Weiss (1991)). Start-ups, especially those
in the early stages, often do not have an established reputation, and may therefore demand
certification. Individual start-ups do not have repeated interactions with organizations associated
with exiting an investment (e.g., acquiring firms or investment bankers), and therefore do not
build a reputation in this community. In the market for affiliation, the supply of financial capital
(and attention) from reputable venture capitalists is limited. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity
in the demand for such association, because entrepreneurs have both different initial endowments
of resources and reputation, as well as different expectations of the marginal benefit of
affiliation.
The market for affiliation is reflected in prices offered by VCs and accepted by
entrepreneurs in the exchange of start-up equity for venture capital. Moreover, the price that VCs
pay to acquire start-up equity is important to both entrepreneurs and VCs. For entrepreneurs, the
valuation they receive at a round of financing determines how much equity is sold for a given
capital infusion, and may have corporate control implications. Venture capitalists also care about
price. In a liquidity event, VCs earn the difference between the share price at that time and the
price they paid to acquire the start-up’s equity. Interestingly, Megginson and Weiss forward the
notion that entrepreneurs may have to compromise valuation to “pay” for VC certification: “one
of the services that entrepreneurial firms purchase with VC funding is easier access to capital
markets and the ability of venture capitalists to reduce asymmetrical information in the offering
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process” (1991, p. 883; emphasis added). Left unanswered, however, is the purchase price startups pay to access reputable VCs. The next section therefore addresses the question of what
makes a VC reputable.
B. What Makes VCs Reputable?
The business press and descriptive literature have characterized simple monetary capital
infusion as commodity-like in the early-stage start-up process, and VCs have sought to
differentiate themselves by the quality of business services and reputational capital they bring to
their portfolio companies (e.g., New York Times (2000)). Some VCs argue that while start-ups
might give up a larger equity stake in their company for a given capital infusion by a more
experienced VC, the entrepreneur’s remaining stake in his company is more valuable ex post as a
result of the venture capitalist’s value-added services. These services include business referrals,
extensive mentoring, and financial assistance (MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1989)), which
may be particularly important for early-stage start-ups (Roberts (1991)). Entrepreneurs seem to
accept the reasoning that there is value in being associated with experienced and connected VCs:
Venture funding is available from many sources. Entrepreneurs choose a lead venture partner to
tap into practical experience, contacts, and reputations. “The money is all the same,” says Louis
Volpe, president of Arrowpoint Communications. “But what type of additional value do you get?
With Matrix Ventures, you get experienced people and a good network in telecom.” Those
intangibles can make the difference in landing a key early customer, attracting top caliber
employees, and lining up the best IPO underwriters. The experience can make a real difference
driving a brand new company in the right direction fast. (Boston Globe (2000, p. D1).

Therefore, as a venture capitalist gains more investment experience in a particular
industrial sector, he or she is more likely to acquire the expertise needed to help start-ups in their
portfolio acquire resources for successful development, which is a powerful contributor to VC
reputation. Investment experience also accords with Gompers’ (1996) age proxy for VC
reputation. Each additional investment extends the VC’s information network, either acquiring
important social contacts and/or gaining experience in effectively structuring deals or monitoring
entrepreneurs in the industrial sector (Sorenson and Stuart (2001)). For example, Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers, a prominent venture capital firm, claims to facilitate interorganizational
cooperation among its network of portfolio companies by “brokering” strategically important
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information among them. As evidence, the firm claims that there are over 100 strategic alliances
among its portfolio companies, and the firm’s web site (www.kpcb.com) notes:
We borrow the term “keiretsu” from Japan’s powerful networks of companies. However, unlike
Japan, Kleiner’s keiretsu is a particularly western, entrepreneurial, loosely coupled web of
relationships. Kleiner doesn’t control any ventures: they’re each independent, run by strong,
outstanding entrepreneurs. There’s no central controlling bank, or interlocking board of directors.
But the executives in the KPCB Keiretsu often share experiences, insight, knowledge and
information. This network, comprised of more than 175 companies and thousands of executives,
has proven to be an invaluable tool to entrepreneurs in both emerging and developing companies.

Lindsey (2002) provides empirical support for this VC “keiretsu” phenomenon. Indeed,
the VC information brokerage role can be particularly important to start-up development since
these early stage private firms face imperfect markets for information (Aoki (2000)). Thin
markets for information arise both because start-ups are secretive in order to protect their
competitive position, and because there may be few alternate channels outside of a trusted third
party for information dissemination.
In addition, VCs acting as information brokers may assist a start-up in business
development in different ways depending on the stage of the enterprise. In the earlier stages, VCs
may help in recruiting senior executive officers (Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and Hellmann and
Puri (2002)) and in striking strategic alliances (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999)). In the later
stages of start-up development, VCs may help assemble additional funds and/or achieve
liquidity. This may be done through hiring talented investment bankers (Barry et al. (1990) and
Megginson and Weiss (1991)) or in locating merger or acquisition partners (Gans, Hsu, and
Stern (2002)). Because these resources are reinforced by the VC’s investment experience in the
start-up’s industrial sector, entrepreneurial demand for VC affiliation should be increasing in the
VC’s industry deal experience. The dual hypotheses to be tested are therefore: (a) Offers made
by more reputable VCs are more likely to be accepted, and (b) the price that entrepreneurs pay
in the market for affiliation is inversely associated with VC reputation.

II. Methodology and Data
A. Methodology
To test these hypotheses, I use a method drawn from Stern (2000) in collecting data on
the bundle of offers – both accepted and declined – made to start-ups for financing the first
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professional round. This methodology, by taking an offer as the unit of analysis, is well suited to
studying the market for affiliation, because examining multiple price observations associated
with venture capitalists of varying reputation for a given start-up in effect traces out a demand
curve for affiliation.3 Start-up firm effects can be held constant in examining valuation
differences across financing offers, thus mitigating the problem of unobserved heterogeneity.
Consequently, the empirical focus can shift to examining the role of differences in VC
characteristics.
The empirical models estimate two equations using a financing offer from the multipleoffers dataset as the unit of analysis. The likelihood that an offer is accepted is modeled as:
Pr (Offer accepted = 1) = F (VC Reputation, Valuation, Controls).

(1)

This offer acceptance equation is estimated using fixed effects logit models. The valuation
equation is modeled as follows, and is estimated using fixed effects OLS regressions:
Valuation = F (VC Reputation, Controls).

(2)

In implementing this method, it is important to study early-stage financing rounds. Earlystage investors can weigh heavily in shaping the identity of subsequent investors (often through
referrals or by virtue of their reputation). As well, earlier rounds of financing are usually
associated with more technical and demand uncertainty. As a result, conventional valuation
methods are difficult to apply to young firms with intangible assets, and so valuations of earlystage start-ups are subject to a great deal of negotiation (rather than straightforward calculation).
The resulting heterogeneity in prices for association with disparate VCs (which themselves vary
in reputation) is an important feature of early-stage funding rounds that help identify the market
for affiliation.
This section describes both the details of the data collection process and the data used to
test the key hypothesis. Before doing so, however, it is useful to address two issues: (1) Potential
biases resulting from a simple cross-sectional analysis, and (2) data collection challenges
associated with employing the proposed methodology. Regarding the first issue, unobserved or
mismeasured start-up qualities correlated with the price VCs pay for equity, such as differences
in the demand for affiliation with reputable VCs, may bias cross-sectional estimates.
3

To my knowledge, the incidence of start-ups receiving multiple financing offers has been investigated only by
Smith (1999) who reports that 71% of the responding companies in his survey received more than one financing
offer. While the rate of multiple offers is interesting in its own right, the current study instead uses multiple
financing offer events to identify the market for affiliation.
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Furthermore, there may be unobserved selection processes matching start-ups with VCs. Without
detailed controls for such processes, cross-sectional estimates may be biased in a way sensitive
to the sampling scheme.
To collect data on a start-up’s financing offers is a challenge in itself, since early-stage
entrepreneurs are typically (and rightfully) reluctant to disclose information that might
compromise their strategic position (Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Hellmann and Puri (2000)).
In addition, VC market consulting companies do not collect data on the bundle of financing
offers received by start-ups. Consequently, obtaining the set of declined financing offers (rather
than assembling a matched comparable, for example) requires asking entrepreneurs themselves
for the sensitive information. I do so through a survey instrument. While designing and
administering the survey was a labor-intensive process, few substitutes exist to gather detailed
information about (1) the founding and organization of the start-up, (2) the VCs offering to
invest in the start-up, and (3) the prices that were offered. A brief section describing institutional
details about the sampled start-ups precedes a discussion about the data.
A.1. The MIT E-Lab Program
The MIT Entrepreneurship Program offers a semester-long class, “Entrepreneurship
Laboratory” (“E-Lab”), which assembles teams of MIT and Harvard graduate students to study
specific business-related issues at actual start-ups. In exchange for a complimentary business
development analysis done by graduate students, the E-Lab firms’ senior executive officers
commit to allocating a certain amount of time and effort to interacting with the students. E-Lab
began in 1995 and approximately 300 start-up companies had applied to participate in the
program by the summer of 2000. Far more companies apply for the program, however, than the
supply of student teams can accommodate.
In order to qualify for E-Lab, the start-up has to meet two criteria: (1) Its headcount must
be less than approximately 35 at the time of entering the program, and (2) it must have
completed a Series A round of investment. This group of start-ups is an attractive one to survey
for two reasons. First, the sample includes funded, early-stage start-ups that were not selected for
any qualities related to the price that VCs paid for their equity. Second, because of the MIT
Entrepreneurship Program affiliation, they may be more inclined to participate in this research
study.
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B. Data
The empirical approach requires measures of VC reputation from firms offering to invest
in the sample of E-Lab firms, as well as information about the offers themselves. The survey
instrument (see the appendix) collects this information using a variety of measures, such as the
entrepreneur’s perceived reputation ranking of investors from which it received a financing offer.
More objective data about the VC’s reputation (e.g., investment experience in each high-tech
industrial segment) were collected from the Venture Economics database through Securities Data
Corporation/Thomson Financial.
B.1. The Financing New High-Tech Ventures Survey
After pre-testing the survey with entrepreneurs (both those contemporaneously
undergoing the Series A financing process and those who had already gone through it), VCs,
academics, and intellectual property attorneys, I mailed the survey to the population of
approximately 300 E-Lab companies. I then placed telephone calls to follow up with informants.
The data were collected over the phone over five months starting July 15, 2000. Respondents to
the survey were typically a founder and/or a person who knew the details of a firm’s start-up and
financing history (frequently this was one of the following senior executive officers: a CEO,
CTO, and/or CFO).
Nearly half of the companies in the E-Lab population responded to the survey. Nonrespondents seemed randomly mixed between those without time to participate in the survey and
those (to a lesser extent) unwilling to participate in the study. Formal tests of differences between
observables on the two samples are difficult, however, due to the data constraints on the firms
not in the sample. Indeed, many of the firms in the E-Lab population were not yet listed in
venture capital industry consulting firm databases.
The survey responses yielded a total of 246 offers to 149 start-ups. While 98 of these
start-ups received a single financing offer, 51 of them received more than one offer for financing
their first professional round. The average start-up receiving multiple offers averaged almost
three offers each, resulting in 148 offers made to this set of companies.
As an overview of the entire sample, Table I (Panels A and B) reports the age distribution
of start-ups in the sample, together with the distribution of offers received by the sample of E-
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Lab start-ups. The empirical puzzle in these data is that only 43% of the start-ups among those
receiving multiple offers accepted their best financial offer. Moreover, the start-ups not accepting
their most generous financial offer left a considerable amount of value “on the table,” amounting
to $173.9M in aggregate pre-money valuation. This was calculated as the sum of the differences
between their best financial offer and the accepted offer. For the group of multiple offer firms
declining their best financial offer, the foregone pre-money value as a fraction of the accepted
offer ranged from a low of 3.6% to a high of 217%, with an average of 33.2% for the sample.
This descriptive interpretation of the data, of course, would be different if the overall sample of
single and multiple offers were considered, as shown in Table I.
[Insert TABLE I around here]
Panel B of Table I also describes the means of a wide range of start-up characteristics,
broken out by the number of offers received. These characteristics include start-up founding
year; Series A financing year; number of employees prior to Series A funding; revenues from
first year operations; patent applications and grants; industrial representation; and geographic
location. The average start-up was founded in the first half of 1997 and received its Series A
funding just 14 months later (over 80% of the start-ups in the dataset received Series A funding
between 1998 and 2000). Prior to receiving this funding round, the average start-up in the sample
employed 10 people and had about $0.27M in revenues from first-year operations. As well, by
the end of 2000, the typical start-up had applied for 5.4 patents and had received 1.2 patent
grants. A high proportion of the start-ups, 74%, were located in Massachusetts, which may not
be surprising given the nature of the E-Lab program (by comparison, 53% of the accepted VC
offers were from Massachusetts-based VC firms). Additionally, 13% of the start-ups in the
sample were located in California (15% of the accepted VC offers were from California-based
VC firms).
The industrial representation of the E-Lab start-ups in the sample is fairly typical of the
broader set of industries funded by venture capitalists over the same time period (the average ELab firm in the sample received Series A funding in the middle of 1998). Of the sampled
companies, 26% are in Internet services, 17% are in Internet infrastructure, and 5% are in
Internet retailing. The software sector comprises about 16% of the sample, while computer
hardware represents 6% of the sample. Communications and health sciences (biotechnology and
medical devices) each comprise 10% of the sample, respectively. This distribution of firms
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seems to mirror the overall financing trends by VCs from 1997 to 2000. For example, according
to Venture Economics, in 1999, 43% of VC disbursements went to Internet-based start-ups, and
57% of VC funds in the first three quarters of 2000 were invested in that sector.
While Panel B of Table I presents the conditional means of the observable start-up
characteristics by the number of offers received, it is difficult to tell whether statistical
differences exist. Panel C therefore compares sampled start-ups receiving single offers with
those receiving multiple offers via t-tests of equality of means. The results reveal that the startups’ qualities between the single versus multiple-offers subsamples were statistically the same
between the groups.
Panel D presents similar tests for the subsamples of VC characteristics. While these
figures reflect accepted offers and are likely the result of a bargaining process between
entrepreneurs and VCs, it is likely that the multiple-offers subsample contains the better deals
(with higher pre-money valuations, more funding offered, and greater interest from more
experienced VCs).
In order to use the start-up fixed effects methodology previously described, only the set
of firms receiving multiple financing offers is analyzed in the remaining empirical tables. While
selection issues as a result of this empirical strategy may be of concern, the finding that start-up
characteristics are statistically the same across recipients of single- and multiple-financing offers
is reassuring. As well, tests of result robustness using Heckman’s (1979) selection-adjusted
estimators employing the full dataset are presented at the conclusion of the empirical analysis.
While there are some potential costs to relying on the multiple-offers subsample (selection
issues), the benefits are in identifying the affiliation effect, a result that will become clear by
comparing the results using the multiple offers methodology (Tables IV through VIII) with
“cross-sectional” results based on realized financing outcomes of the entire E-Lab sample (Table
IX). In addition, because the multiple-offers subsample likely contains better deals, this bias may
actually make it more difficult to find an affiliation effect, since the most promising ventures
would potentially have the least to gain from VC affiliation.
B.2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
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Table II reports variable definitions and summary statistics for the multiple-offers sample
in which the unit of analysis is an offer to a start-up, while Table III contains the correlation
matrix for these variables.
[Insert TABLE II and TABLE III around here]
Two measures of price are used in the empirical analysis. Pre-money valuation, the
product of the number of shares outstanding before the Series A financing round and the offered
per-unit share price (mean = $20.6M), has become a standard measure in the literature (Gompers
and Lerner (2000)). Relative valuation offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up
relative to the highest offered valuation received by that start-up (mean = 0.83). Note that
because many of these financing rounds took place during the late 1990s, the inflated valuations
characterizing the “Internet bubble” are likely reflected here. Two additional factors may also be
reflected in these valuations: (1) Several of the companies had prior informal funding rounds–
such as “angel” and/or “friends and family” rounds before their first professional round, and (2)
financing offers given to start-ups with multiple offers averaged $8.9M more in pre-money
valuation relative to their single-offer counterparts, a statistically significant difference. In any
case, instead of focusing on the magnitude of valuation offered, the primary concern here is to
explain variance across financing offers for a given start-up. Given these circumstances, relative
valuation offered is the preferred measure of price throughout the empirical analysis (though premoney valuation and relative valuation offered are positively correlated at 0.40).
The key independent variables are correlates of VC reputation.4 In accord with the
concept of VC reputation as expected quality based on previous experience, several “objective”
measures are employed, based on data as of December 31, 2000 from the Venture Economics
database. They include high industry deal experience, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number
of investments the VC has made in the start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the
sample median (mean = 0.44). This is the main measure of reputation used in the empirical
tables, and is consistent with the concept that VC “domain expertise” is an important input to
both VC reputation and VCs’ ability to add value to their portfolio companies.
4

If a start-up’s Series A round was syndicated, I used information from the lead VC, as prior research suggests that
lead investors devote more direct resources to assisting their portfolio companies relative to syndication partners
(Gorman and Sahlman (1989)). A syndicated offer is counted as a single offer in this study. Syndicates are common
among the accepted offers (65%), a fact that is not surprising given the early stage financing rounds examined.
Unfortunately, my survey did not capture the full syndicate for offers that were not accepted, and so I am not able to
test whether syndication has an effect on the likelihood of offer acceptance and on valuation.
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Two measures proxy for services and resources that VCs provide for start-ups. The
measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the
maximum Likert-scale measure (of five) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC
network resources: Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, and contacts
with investment banks (mean = 0.43). A second (alternative) measure of resource transfer is a
proxy for the available time a general partner has to potentially devote to start-up development,
boards per general partner (mean = 4.2). This measure divides the number of boards of directors
on which a VC firm participates by the number of general partners in the VC firm. While the
pair-wise correlation between high network resources rating and boards per general partner is
not particularly high (0.05), it is interesting to note that there is some degree of correlation
between boards per general partner and high industry deal experience (0.46). These correlations
may be due to a countervailing boards per general partner effect: A high ratio may proxy for
network connections that may be valuable for start-up development.
Finally, two additional measures of reputation are used as robustness checks in the
analysis. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy equal to 1 if the number of prior
funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per year(s) of operation places the VC above
the sample median. This variable (mean = 0.57) is a measure of VC success in raising additional
financial capital from limited partners, a requirement for survival in the VC industry.5 While the
internal rate of return (IRR) of past VC funds would be a nice measure of reputation, IRRs are
usually held confidential by VC firms (Gompers and Lerner (1999)). Industry reputation rank
(mean = 5.9) is an ordered ranking, 7 being first best and 1 being worst, of VC reputation among
offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur in the survey instrument (the measure has been
reversed from the original survey-based measure for expositional ease). Because this variable is
based on entrepreneurial perception and measures relative exclusiveness, industry reputation
rank incorporates the notion that the value of affiliation may depend on the VC’s hierarchical
position (Frank (1985) and Podolny (1993)). The subjective nature of this measure warrants

5

A priori we would expect that high industry deal experience and high normalized funds raised would be positively
correlated. The -0.21 pair-wise correlation may result because the two measures are derived indicator variables for
the top half of the deal experience and prior funds raised distributions. Reassuringly, the pair-wise correlation
between the number of prior VC deals in the industry sector and prior funds raised is positively correlated at 0.56.
As well, the unconditioned pair-wise correlations between high industry deal experience and high normalized funds
raised do not reflect control for any other VC or start-up characteristics.
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discussion of its use, however (see below); consequently this measure will be used only for
robustness checks in the empirical analysis.
A group of controls for other VC characteristics is used throughout the empirical
analysis. The variable corporate VC is a dummy variable (mean = 0.11) for whether the VC is a
corporate investor, since evidence and theory suggest that this method of organizing
entrepreneurial finance has different organizational and incentive implications relative to
independent venture capitalists (Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Hellmann (2002)). The variable
angel investor is a dummy equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel or angel group (mean =
0.07). The variable equity taken threshold is a dummy equal to 1 if the investor receives at least
30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) (mean = 0.52). While equity taken threshold
may be endogenous to price, this variable may be an indicator of corporate control implications
of an offer, and is therefore included as a control variable. The variable financing offered is the
amount of capital offered by the investor in the Series A financing round (mean = $7.86M). The
previous two measures are meant to proxy for the fact that entrepreneurs may prefer offers that
allow them to retain a higher stake of equity in their company. As well, larger financing offers
may delay the need to return to venture capitalists for additional funding, providing a liquidity
benefit to the new venture.

III. Empirical Results
The empirical assignment is straightforward—to test the hypotheses that (a) financing
offers from more reputable VCs are more likely to be accepted, and (b) more reputable VCs
acquire start-up equity at a discount. This section is therefore organized around empirical tables
that demonstrate these relationships in both univariate and multivariate settings.
Table IV shows simple univariate comparisons of conditional means without controlling
for fixed firm effects. Panel A describes difference in means tests for accepted versus declined
financing offers. While the average pre-money value of accepted offers is $17.7M, the declined
offers averaged $22.1M (the difference is not statistically significant, however). Accepted offers
had higher values of VC reputation relative to non-accepted offers, as measured four ways. The
measures normalized industry deal experience (industry deal experience per year(s) of
operation), normalized funds raised (number of funds raised per year(s) of operation), industry
reputation rank, and high network resources rating all have higher values for accepted offers
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relative to declined ones. The differences in means for the latter three variables are statistically
significant. Panel B describes the conditional means of relative valuation offered for the upper
and lower halves (divided at the median) of normalized industry deal experience, normalized
funds raised, industry reputation rank, and high network resources rating. Examining the
conditional means of relative valuation offered rather than pre-money valuation in this context is
preferred because the former measure incorporates some information about the comparative
nature of the offers. The latter measure does not group offers by start-up firms in any way. While
the differences in conditional means for the four reputation measures are not statistically
significant, each of the relative means is consistent with the argument that more reputable VCs
offer a discount to Series A valuation. Specifically, higher measures of VC reputation are
associated with lower valuation offers. These univariate tests, while suggestive, do not control
for qualities of the start-up, and so the remaining tables present a more systematic, multivariate
analysis.
[Insert TABLE IV around here]
Table V examines start-up fixed effects logits of VC offer accepted using Chamberlain’s
(1980) conditional likelihood method. Specification (5-1) shows that in the bivariate case, high
industry deal experience is positively associated with VC offer accepted, at a statistically
significant level (5%) and implies a 2.94-fold change in the odds of offer acceptance for a
discrete change in this measure of VC reputation. While a more systematic exploration of the
robustness of the VC reputation result is found in Table VII, a similar result holds in the bivariate
relationship between VC offer accepted and high normalized funds raised. The reputation result
is strengthened when a measure of valuation, relative valuation offered, is included in
specification (5-2). Notice the relative importance of the reputation effect over the valuation
effect on the likelihood that an offer is accepted. Specification (5-3) includes an additional
measure of VC reputation, high network resources rating, and controls for a variety of VC- and
terms-of-financing-effects: Angel investor, corporate venture capital, financing offered, and
equity taken threshold. The high network resources rating measure is meant to capture VC
value-added effects through contacts and/or resources that could make an offer more attractive
(and can contribute to VC reputation). The estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The measure angel investor is meant to capture the fact
that a knowledgeable angel investor could be a substitute for a reputable VC in providing
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certification and business development resources, while the corporate VC method of organizing
entrepreneurial finance may have implications for the value they can add to portfolio firms
(Gompers and Lerner (1999)). Higher levels of financing offered may be a VC offer feature that
may make it more attractive, since entrepreneurs may not have to return as many times or as
soon for further financing rounds (fund-raising is an activity that may be quite time-consuming
for start-up executives). Finally, the reputation result is not sensitive to the choice of a wide
range of equity taken threshold levels between 20 and 50% of equity taken in the financing round
(unreported regressions).
[Insert TABLE V around here]
Notice that start-up characteristics are not included in these specifications. Since start-up
characteristics (such as industry representation) are invariant across offers for a given start-up,
including these qualities in the regressions does not affect the results. In addition, because
financing offers for a given start-up did not span a large time window, variables on financing
timing were not included in the regressions. In the pre-test of the survey, I asked respondents
about the time window issue. It was my sense based on these interviews that the time window
was not open for a long duration, given the start-up financing conditions of the late 1990s.
Unfortunately, in the survey, I only noted the date of the realized Series A funding round, so I
am unable to empirically document the time window length. Notwithstanding this shortcoming,
the main result from Table V is that start-ups in this sample may not be selecting investors
primarily on the basis of price and valuation; instead, VC reputation and affiliation effects may
indeed be more important.
Table VI presents relative valuation offered start-up fixed effects OLS regressions. The
reported standard errors are robust – having been adjusted for clustering by start-up firm. The
pairwise specification with high industry deal experience in (6-1) shows a negative relationship
that is statistically significant at the 5% level. As well, the estimated coefficient implies a
substantial discount, 14%, on relative valuation offered for a discrete change in the measure of
VC reputation.
[Insert TABLE VI around here]
In (6-2), together with the measure of VC reputation, a dummy variable for VC offer
accepted is included as a regressor. Notice that this parameter estimate, while positive (in both 62) and (6-3)), does not achieve statistical significance and is small in magnitude. The reputation
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effect persists and is of a slightly larger estimated magnitude relative to the previous
specification. In model (6-3), several additional variables (parallel to those used in the prior
table) are introduced. While the economic significance of the reputation result is slightly
diminished in this specification, the parameter is estimated more precisely, achieving statistical
significance at the 1% level. While the high network resources rating estimate is not statistically
significant, it is estimated with a negative coefficient, which is consistent with the main
hypothesis tested. The estimated coefficient on equity taken threshold is negative and significant
at the 1% level, suggesting that larger equity stakes are associated with price discounts, though
as previously mentioned, endogeneity concerns moderate the interpretation of this control
variable. As well, the logarithm of financing offered is estimated with a positive, significant
coefficient, indicating that the magnitude of funding, including potential liquidity effects, is
associated with higher valuation. While robustness checks of the valuation regressions are
presented in Table VIII, the results presented in Table VI are consistent with the idea that startup entrepreneurs pay a premium to accept financing from more reputable venture capitalists.
Because the above-reported results may be an artifact of either the particular measures
used or due to selection biases arising from examining the multiple-offers dataset, Tables VII
and VIII present robustness checks of the reputation results for the offer acceptance and
valuation regressions, respectively. The first three columns of Table VII successively employ
alternate measures of VC reputation in fixed effects logits to study the robustness of the positive
correlation between VC offer accepted and reputation in similar specifications to (5-3).
Specification (7-1) substitutes high normalized funds raised for high industry deal experience as
one of the measures of reputation. While the statistical significance falls to the 10% level, a
discrete change in the funds raised measure corresponds to a doubling of the odds that an offer is
accepted. Relative to specification (5-3), the estimated coefficient of high network resource
rating is very similar in (7-1), both in magnitude and in statistical significance. In (7-2), industry
reputation rank substitutes for high industry deal experience as an alternative measure of VC
reputation. In this specification, both industry reputation rank and high network resources rating
are positive and significant at the 1% level, though the estimated coefficient on relative valuation
offered is much larger in comparative magnitude than the reputation measures. In (7-3), boards
per general partner is used as an alternative measure of VC resources and is meant to capture the
available time that partners in VC firms might have available in mentoring, developing, and
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connecting start-ups. While that variable is estimated with a nearly zero effect, the other
reputation measure used in this specification, high industry deal experience, is estimated with
quantitatively similar results (statistically and economically) to those found in Table V. Varying
the measure of valuation as a control variable from relative valuation offered to the log of premoney valuation causes high industry deal experience to fall to the 6% level, but does not alter
the economic significance of the estimate (unreported specification).
[Insert TABLE VII around here]
Thus far, the analysis has not taken into account the possibility of a selection bias as a
result of only using the multiple offers data, though descriptive data from Table I suggest no
statistical differences in the key observable start-up characteristics in the subsamples of the data
corresponding to single versus multiple offers. Had we observed the alternate option for
entrepreneurs that factually received single offers, would the results persist? Because
establishing that counterfactual is difficult, two-stage Heckman (1979) regressions are presented
where in the first stage, a probit of the likelihood of multiple offers is estimated using qualities of
the start-up. These estimates are used in a second-stage fixed-effects regression of VC offer
accepted (in Table VII) and relative valuation offered (in Table VIII) as an adjustment for
possible selection effects.
The first-stage regression in Tables VII and VIII includes start-up covariates of the
likelihood of receiving multiple offers: The natural logarithm of the pre-Series A number of
start-up employees, L initial employees; a dummy equal to 1 if the start-up does not have
assigned patents, zero patents; dummy variables for the following industry sectors: Internet
industry (including infrastructure, services, and retail subsegments); health science industry
(biotechnology and medical devices); computer industry (software and hardware); and year of
Series A financing dummies for Year 1998, Year 1999, and Year 2000.6 Second-stage fixedeffects Heckman linear probability estimates of VC offer accepted are reported in the final two

6

The omitted category for the industry variables is the communications industry. The results of the selection
equation are found at the bottom of Tables VII and VIII. Note that the selection equation includes variables (start-up
characteristics) that are likely to act as good instruments because these characteristics are not relevant in the secondstage analysis (they are absorbed by the start-up fixed effects).
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columns of Table VII.7 While the bivariate specification including high industry deal experience
(7-4) is estimated more precisely (significant at the 1% level) relative to its counterpart in (5-1),
the economic magnitude of the estimate is diminished. Meanwhile, the fully specified model (75) yields estimates of similar statistical significance to its counterpart in (5-3), though again with
diminished economic significance levels.
Table VIII explores the robustness of the valuation results. A parallel specification
structure to that used in the previous robustness table is employed. Specification (8-1) substitutes
high normalized funds raised as one of the measures of VC reputation. While the high
normalized VC funds raised variable is estimated with a positive (though insignificant)
coefficient, recall that univariate comparisons in Table IV indicate that high normalized VC
funds raised was negatively correlated with relative valuation offered (although the difference
was not statistically significant). In the multivariate regression, the prior funds variable may be
picking up some countervailing effects, such that VCs with more prior funds raised are able to
raise subsequent funds of larger sizes.8 The resulting relaxation in VC liquidity may have a
confounding effect on this proxy for VC reputation.
[Insert TABLE VIII around here]
Specification (8-2) utilizes an alternate measure of VC reputation, industry reputation
rank. The variable estimate is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, an
objection to using this measure of reputation is that it is subject to entrepreneurial recall bias
and/or ex-post rationalization by the survey respondent. As an imperfect control for these
potential effects, a dummy variable for VC offer accepted is included in the specification,
because the accepted offer is likely to be the chief candidate for recall and retrospection biases.
Although the reputation measure is statistically significant at conventional levels, we should
interpret the result cautiously because of the limitations of this measure.
In both specifications (8-1) and (8-2), high network resources rating, a measure of VC
services to and resources for the start-up (and an important contributor to VC reputation), is
estimated with a negative (though insignificant) coefficient, a finding consistent with the results
7

Testing the robustness of VC offer accepted in the context of fixed effects Heckman selection models presents an
econometric challenge—known as the incidental parameters problem (Heckman (1981) and Hsiao (1986))—in that
there are no consistent estimators for fixed-effects probits. Therefore, fixed-effect Heckman regressions using a
second-stage linear probability model are reported. The results are robust to this estimation strategy, though the
linear probability model is biased when predicted values fall outside of the (0, 1) range.
8
Indeed, the measure does not take into account variation in achieved VC fund size across the sample (e.g., a prior
fund of $750M is treated the same as a $30M fund in the count of prior funds raised).
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from Table VI.9 Specification (8-3) varies this measure of VC resources to boards per general
partner, and while the measure reaches statistical significance at the 10% level, the economic
effect is insignificant. Importantly, note that the high industry deal experience proxy for VC
reputation is robust (though reduced in statistical significance due to some degree of collinearity
with boards per general partner). In an unreported regression, the log of pre-money valuation
was used as an alternate measure of valuation. The estimates of high industry deal experience
were robust to this variation. As well, introducing specifications with dummy variables for the
most frequently appearing VC firms in the sample did not alter the main results (unreported
regressions). These indicator variables may be appropriate if we believe that the pricing behavior
of a handful of VCs is driving the results (over 100 distinct VC firms are represented in the
sample, however).
Finally, in (8-4) and (8-5), fixed-effects Heckman regressions are reported using the
entire sample of single and multiple offers in an effort to address potential selection issues. In
both the bivariate and the fully specified equations, the results are very similar to those reported
in Table VI—while the economic significance of the results is unchanged, the precision of the
estimates is slightly enhanced.10
A final robustness check suggested that the hypothesized affiliation effects can be found
using within-industry variation, though these results are not formally reported because they are
merely suggestive. With the caveat that the categories of “Internet” (that includes Internet
infrastructure, Internet services, and Internet retailing) and “non-Internet” (that includes
biotechnology, medical devices, communications, and computer software and hardware) are very
coarse groupings, the measures of VC reputation (high industry deal experience and high
network resources rating) are positively associated with VC offer acceptance and negatively
associated with relative valuation offered, although these relationships tend to hold more

9

As well, potential effects of geographic co-location between VC and start-up in facilitating resource exchange were
explored. Tests were conducted to examine (a) whether geographic co-location of VC and start-up mattered for offer
acceptance or for valuation, and (b) whether VCs located in California or Massachusetts were advantaged in offer
acceptance or equity pricing. In both cases, there were no notable results. This may not be the ideal dataset to test
such geographic effects, however (most of the start-ups in the dataset are based in Massachusetts).
10
Estimates of lambda (the inverse of Mill’s ratio) and rho (the correlation between error terms in the first and
second stage equations) in the Heckman models suggest that selection problems are not severe, and so these
selection regressions are not reported for all specifications in the paper.
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strongly for the non-Internet subsample and less so for the Internet subsample.11 These results
are based on parsimonious specifications (keeping the limited sample size issue in mind);
however, due to the nature of the dataset, no conclusions about whether these results are due to
time period effects can be made.
To conclude the empirical analysis, it is interesting to compare these results to a simple
cross-sectional OLS analysis of the natural log of pre-money valuation on all accepted offers,
done as if information on the bundle of declined offers were not available. The results, presented
in Table IX, are striking.
[Insert TABLE IX around here]
In (9-1), a bivariate regression, high industry deal experience, is estimated with a positive
coefficient, which is significant at the 1% level. When several start-up qualities are included in
specification (9-2), the VC reputation result persists, disappearing in statistical significance only
with the inclusion of VC characteristics (9-3), though the reputation measure is still estimated
with a positive coefficient in that specification. As previously mentioned, problems of
unobserved heterogeneity likely bias these estimates.

IV. Conclusion and Discussion
I have tested and confirmed the proposition that entrepreneurs are willing to accept a
discount on the valuation of their start-up in order to access the capital of venture capitalists with
better reputations. These results help deepen our understanding of the market for affiliation by
presenting empirical evidence that affiliation is an ordinary economic good for which actors
seeking association will face a price-reputation trade off. This finding is consistent with the view
that venture capitalists’ reputation (which in turn depends on their experience, information
network, and direct assistance to the portfolio firms) may be more distinctive than their
functionally equivalent financial capital. These conclusions are drawn from an analysis of
multiple offers to a set of start-ups, which allows a high degree of statistical control. Because the

11

Because of the contemporaneous emergence of the Internet industry, high industry deal experience may not be a
good measure in this empirical setting (I thank the referee for pointing this out). While there is variation in this
measure within the subsamples, it is doubtful that high industry deal experience is an adequate proxy for VC
knowledge and experience helpful for start-up development in the Internet industries. Using the industry reputation
rank proxy for reputation yields strong results, though the problems with this measure are discussed elsewhere in the
paper. Using high normalized funds raised yields similar results for the VC offer accepted regressions but rather
weak results for the valuation regressions.
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characteristics of the start-up can be held constant, only differences in VC reputation across
financing offers explain inter-offer variation in offer acceptance and price for start-up equity.
One may wonder why prices charged by competing VCs to acquire the equity in a given
start-up can be differentiated in equilibrium, given free entry. VCs with higher reputations may
be able to sustain their higher prices (rather than having competition equilibrate prices) as a
result of investments in reputation being costly (Shapiro (1983) and Megginson and Weiss
(1991)). Consequently, while financial capital per se is not a differentiated good, the reputation
of venture capitalists providing the financial capital can be a source of differentiation among VC
organizations. The findings in this article are consistent with Kaplan and Schoar’s (2003) recent
evidence of substantial cross-sectional variation and persistence in VC fund performance.
Several alternate explanations to the empirical pattern have been considered throughout
the empirical analysis. First, more savvy VC firms might have foreseen the coming public
market downturn and offered lower prices as a result. However, entrepreneurs receiving multiple
offers would not necessarily have to accept offers from such VC firms, and so this explanation
does not seem consistent with the observed empirical pattern. A second alternative hypothesis is
that the term sheet covenants across offers for a given start-up may have differed. Indeed, the
price VCs offer for equity may not be the only factor that matters when entrepreneurs select a
VC firm, and other dimensions of the term sheet may not be “priced in” to the offered valuations.
While surveyed entrepreneurs were asked for a copy of their term sheet offers, very few
complied with this request. However, Suchman (1995) provides some evidence of convergence
in VC financing agreements over time as a result of using the same law firms. As well, while
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find that covenants in VC contracts differ by stage of start-up
development, the offered terms of financing for a given start-up across VC firms may not be as
variable. Nevertheless, different VCs probably prefer different terms, and offered terms are
likely to vary even for a given start-up in a particular time period. As a result, comparing offers
primarily on the basis of price is an inherent limitation of the present study.
Several additional issues associated with the data used for this study result in
interpretational concerns. First, are the findings simply an artifact of the sample used? Although
this group of companies might be of higher quality relative to average start-ups (assuming that
the decision to be involved with MIT is a signal of quality), the sample, while modest at 148
offers, may represent a conservative test of the hypothesized effect. High quality entrepreneurs
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have their own reputations and established networks, which would tend to obviate the need to
pay a premium to access capital from more experienced funding sources. In any case, employing
start-up fixed effects makes this quality issue less important for the purposes of the empirical
analysis. Indeed, the unique timing of the study in an environment in which many VCs were
“chasing after deals” allowed identification of the market for affiliation—though it does not
necessarily address the applicability of these results to other time periods or other relationships.
It is difficult, unfortunately, to speculate on that answer.
A second issue is whether the results are produced from the competitive effect associated
with studying a sample of multiple offers. This proposition is also hard to evaluate, however, due
to the difficulty of establishing a counterfactual to single-offer situations. On a related note, a
deeper understanding of the process leading to multiple offers would be desirable. The manifold
processes generating offers (some of which are unobserved, such as entrepreneurial charisma), as
well as the disparate bargaining processes leading to offers, makes the fixed-effects methodology
attractive in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, had I collected information
about the sequencing of offers, I might have been able to gain some empirical insight into the
process generating multiple offers. Sequencing data may have also helped in beginning to
empirically disentangle the pure affiliation effect from the VC value-added effect.
Two issues related to offers and how they might affect the interpretation of the results are
also worth discussing. First, what if entrepreneurs “shopped” their deal to other VCs without
receiving a formal term sheet? Unfortunately, I do not have the history of how many pitches
entrepreneurs made to different VC groups without receiving formal offers. The results may be
biased if (a) informal offers were leveraged to negotiate more favorable formal offers, and (b)
VCs with a less established reputation were more willing to revise their valuations upward
relative to VCs with more established reputations. Unfortunately, data constraints prohibit this
analysis; however, survey respondents were instructed to provide information on final formal
term sheets only (including informal offers would have subjected the sample to entrepreneurial
interpretation of what constituted an informal offer). A second issue is whether some of the high
valuation offers were withdrawn by VCs as the negotiations became more serious. Again,
systematic data are unfortunately unavailable to address this question. If withdrawals came from
across the full distribution of VCs, this would not bias the results. If, on the other hand,
withdrawals were systematically from less-reputable VCs, the study would be biased toward
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finding the results (and the opposite would be true if reputable VCs tended to withdraw offers).
Given the market environment (“money chasing deals”) in which these data were collected in the
second half of 2000 and my conversations with survey respondents, however, I believe that offer
withdrawal was not a pervasive phenomenon in this sample. However, because I cannot rule out
these two issues, they represent caveats to the study.
A final issue is interpreting what start-ups are buying. For example, industry deal
experience in the start-up’s sector can proxy for both the scope of the VC’s information network
as well as the VC’s ability to evaluate deals. Unfortunately, the data in this study do not provide
a clean way of disentangling these effects. As well, higher ability entrepreneurs may be taking a
lower offer in an effort to signal quality (Spence (1974)). While the empirical setting and the
documented empirical patterns make this explanation unlikely, the proposition cannot be ruled
out.
Looking to the future, while this study does not test the ex-post performance implications
of selecting a particular VC, it would be interesting to do so. For example, did start-ups
accepting funding from more reputable VCs receive higher step-ups in valuation in subsequent
rounds? Did they achieve an IPO faster or deliver products to the market more quickly?12
Nevertheless, the findings in this study are consistent with the theory that entrepreneurs who are
tied into more connected networks at reputable VC firms expect to come across more
opportunities for start-up growth, but must pay a premium for such access.

12

As a preliminary analysis, I examined as of January 31, 2002 whether accepting funding from a more reputable
VC was correlated with surviving in the post-bubble shakeout period. While there are issues about the appropriate
lag time to examine such an effect, a substantial fraction of the firms in the sample are either still operating, or were
acquired for an undisclosed amount, rendering an assessment of “success” difficult. For these reasons, these
preliminary analyses were not illuminating.
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APPENDIX:
MIT Sloan Financing New
High-Tech Ventures Survey
Name of Firm: ________________________________________________________________
Location (city, state): ____________________________________________________________
Part I: Background Information
A. Founding the Company
When was your company founded (month, year)? __________________________
When was your company incorporated (month, year)? _______________________
Name of Founder

Current job
title

Company

Reason for leaving
(if applicable)

# of prior
start-ups
founded

Name of prior
start-ups

If the founding team previously started other companies, which category best describes the average
approximate internal rate of return(s) on Series A investment for those previous venture(s)?
<0

0-10%

11-50%

51-100%

101-500%

>500%

How many of those founded firm(s) were taken public? __________________
At the time of start-up, what did your founding team consider to be the company’s key competitive
advantage? (select the most important two)
Establishing a new market

Establishing a new technology

Recruiting superior personnel

Establishing an advantageous cost position

Superior positioning in the product niche

Maintaining superior intellectual property

Superior customer service & responsiveness

Superior product quality / reliability

Other: ________________________________
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B. Employee Information
Number of Employees: at the time of raising Series A financing: ______

as of 7/1/00: ______

Current number of employees in each of the following functions:
R&D

Sales

Marketing

____

____

____

Manufacturing General &
or Operations Admin.
____
____

Service
____

Please indicate which of the senior executive officers below was on the founding team. If not on the
founding team, please designate from what source the executive officer came. Please “x” out the position
if it does not exist in your company, and draw lines connecting positions, if one person holds multiple
positions.
CEO

COO

CFO

CTO

VP,
Marketing

VP,
Sales

VP,
Other:
Bus. Dev. ________

On founding team
Or, contact through:
Personal friend
Classmate
Co-worker
Investor/financier
Recruiter

Advisor

C. Financing the Company
Did you have a completed business plan before getting your Series A funding?

Yes

No

Time from completing the business plan to receiving your first financing offer: ____ months
Who were the participants in your company’s financing(s) to date? If a number of “angel investors”
participated, please group them all as “Angels” in the Investor column. If applicable, please place an asterisk
(*) next to the lead investor.
Round

Date

Investor

Amount

Total number of financing offers for the Series A round: ______
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What is the current percentage of corporate ownership held by the following groups:
Founders
_____%

Employees
Venture
& option pool capitalists
_____%
_____%

“Angel”
investors
_____%

Strategic
investors
_____%

Public
_____%

For the Series A financing, which of the following areas were the subject of active negotiation between
the parties?
Not active
Very active
Pre-money valuation
Board representation
Employee option pool
Vesting schedules
Liquidation rights
Anti-dilution clauses
Other (specify: ____________________)

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Why did you select the offer you chose?
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________

D. Building Corporate Governance
Number of members of the Board of Directors: _____
How many directors are from:

within the firm _____

outside the firm ____

Number of board members appointed by your investors: ______
Please rate the importance of the following functions of your investor-appointed directors:
Oversight and monitoring of the company
Source of advice and counsel to the company
Source of external business contacts
Recruiting and team building
Market validation/prestige

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Do you have a board of advisors?

No

Yes

LOW
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

HIGH
5
5
5
5
5

Please rate the importance of the following functions of your board of advisors, if you have one:
Oversight and monitoring of the company
Source of advice and counsel to the company
Source of external business contacts
Recruiting and team building
Market validation/prestige

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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LOW
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

HIGH
5
5
5
5
5

E. Product, Technology, and Strategy
Which industrial classification best describes your company:
Internet: Services
Internet: E-tailer
Internet: Infra.
Software
Medical Devices
Biotech
Computer hardware
Other (specify: _____________________ )

Internet: Other
Communications

Year 1

2

3

4

5

Year 1

2

3

4

5

Actual company revenues:
(Thousands of dollars)
Actual corporate profits/losses:
Number of:

patent applications filed by your firm:
patents issued to your company:

_____
_____

patents pending: _____

Has your firm entered into any technology licensing deals?
Yes: licensed out
Yes: licensed in
If your firm has licensed-out, what were the terms?
Who were the licensees?

Exclusive

Product market incumbents
Year 1

2

Non-exclusive

Product market entrants
3

4

5

Actual licensing revenues by yr:
(Thousands of dollars)
Has your firm been acquired since its inception?
Yes
No
If so, by whom?
______________________________________________________________________________
At the time of your Series A financing, please rate the importance of each of the following as obstacles to
the commercial success of your enterprise:
Not an obstacle
Lack of brand name image
Lack of distribution channels/sales force
Lack of servicing resources
Lack of manufacturing capability

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
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1
1
1
1

Very important obstacle
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

Part II: Financing Offer Characteristics
Please complete one record for each term sheet you received, copying this form as many times as needed.
If possible, please also attach a copy of the term sheet received from each investor organization.
Name of Investor: _____________________________________________________
Location (City/State): ___________________________________________________
How did you make initial contact with this investor?
Sent an unsolicited business plan
He/she was a personal contact
Referred by an advisor or friend
Other (specify: ________________________________________________ )
If you were referred to the investor through a friend or knew the investor directly, how did you come to
know that person?
__________________________________________________________________________________
Does this investor host a regular conference or formal networking event for top managers of its portfolio
companies?
Yes
No
Does this investor have dedicated personnel to help its portfolio companies in the following areas:
Recruiting
Yes
No
Finance & accounting
Yes
No
Business development
Yes
No
Please rate this financing offer/investor along the following dimensions:
LOW
Overall reputation of this investor
N/A
1
Reputation in your industrial sector
N/A
1
Expected availability to mentor the team
N/A
1
“Chemistry” with this investor
N/A
1
Expected ability to recruit key managers
N/A
1
Potential contacts with key customers or suppliers
N/A
1
Potential contacts with investment banks
N/A
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

HIGH
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

What pre-money valuation did this investor assign to your company at the Series A round?
$________ Million
What post-money valuation did this investor assign to your company at the Series A round?
$________ Million
Proposed equity stake taken by this investor as a result of this financing offer: _______
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5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Part III: Financing Offer Comparison Table
Each column lists a dimension of the financing offer. Please COMPARATIVELY RANK your offers along these dimensions.
(1 = Highest, 2 = Second Highest, etc.)
Name of Financing
Entity

Pre-Money
Valuation

Overall
Reputation of
investor

2
3
1

1
2
3

Reputation of
investor in
your industrial
sector

“Chemistry”
with this
investor

Mentoring

Contacts with
key customers
or suppliers

Recruiting
managers and
employees

Raising
additional
financing

Connections
to professional
services, eg.
investment
banks

1
2
3

3
2
1

2
1
3

EXAMPLE: Financing Offer Comparison
ABC Vultures
FFAF Funds
Complex Angels

2
1
3

3
2
1

3
2
1

1
3
2

FINANCING OFFER COMPARISON RECORD

Please place an asterisk (*) next to the offers you considered most carefully
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Table I
Description of the Overall Dataset
This table describes the overall sample of Series A round financing offers to start-ups. Panel A describes the distribution of
start-ups by year of incorporation. Panel B describes the overall sample, together with the distribution of offers and
characteristics of the start-ups. For the sample of single and multiple offers, 80.5% of the 149 firms accepted their best (and
sometimes only) financing offer. Of the 51 firms receiving multiple offers, 57% did not accept their best financial offer,
leaving $173.9M “on the table,” the sum of the differences between the best financial offer and the accepted offer. For the
group of firms receiving multiple offers and declining their best financial offer, this amount represents an average of 33.2%
pre-money valuation discount as a fraction of their accepted offers. For the overall sample of single and multiple offers,
this statistic is 12.5%. The measure internet industry includes services, infrastructure, retail, or other; computer industry
includes software and hardware; health industry includes medical devices and biotechnology. The measure high industry
deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s
industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places
the VC above the sample median. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received
the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources:
Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure corporate
VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
financing offer is from an angel investor or angel group. The measure financing offered is the amount of capital offered (in
$M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least
30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. Panels C and D report the
conditional means of start-up and VC characteristics, respectively, for the single offer and multiple offer subsamples of the
dataset. The t-tests of equal means between these sub-samples are also reported.

Panel A. Distribution of number of start-ups by year of incorporation

#

1984
1

1989
1

1990
1

1992
2

1993
5

1994
5

1995
13

1996
14

1997
19

1998
27

1999
39

2000
22

Panel B. Description of start-ups and VCs by number of offers received
Start-up characteristics
Number of start-up firms
# firms accepting best financial offer
# firms declining best financial offer
% firms accepting best financial offer
$M “left on table”
Accepted pre-money value
Foregone value as a % of accepted
pre-money value
Year start-up founded
Year of Series A funding
Pre-money valuation ($M)
Pre-Series A employment
First year revenues ($M)
# patent app. 12/31/2000
# patent grants as of 12/31/2000
Internet industry
Computer industry
Health industry
Communications industry
Massachusetts-based start-up
California-based start-up

1
98
98
0
100
0
869.4
0

2
21
9
12
42.9
56.5
147.3
38.4

3
20
11
9
55
50.8
74.2
68.5

1997.2
1998.5
8.9
9.3
0.2
4.9
1.2
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.7
0.1

1998.1
1998.8
11.3
9.4
0.3
3.8
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.8
0.1

1997.6
1998.8
15.4
9.7
0.3
7.8
2.0
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.8
0.2
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Number of offers received
4
5
6
6
3
0
1
1
NA
5
2
NA
16.7
33.3
NA
42.5
8.8
NA
256.5
11.3
NA
16.6
77.9
NA
1997.2
1999.0
48.6
23.0
0.8
12.2
0.7
0.8
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.8
0.0

1998.3
1999.3
10.9
15.7
0.1
3.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.3

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

7
1
0
1
0
15.3
34.7
44.1

Sum/Avg.
149
120
29
80.5%
$174M
1393M
12.5%

1995.0
1999.0
34.7
15.0
0.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0

1997.4
1998.6
11.9
10.1
0.3
5.4
1.2
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.7
0.1

Table I – continued
VC Characteristics
High industry deal experience
High normalized funds raised
High network resources rating
Corporate VC
Angel investor
Financing offered ($M)
Equity taken threshold

1
0.2
0.6
0.4
0.1
0.2
4.3
0.5

2
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.0
0.1
6.3
0.7

3
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.1
0.2
6.0
0.5

Number of offers received
4
5
6
0.5
0.7
NA
0.5
1.0
NA
0.7
0.7
NA
0.0
0.0
NA
0.0
0.0
NA
14.3
6.0
NA
0.7
0.7
NA

7
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
13.7
0.0

Sum/Avg.
0.3
0.7
0.4
0.0
0.2
5.3
0.6

Panel C. Comparison of start-up characteristics across offers received subsamples
Variable
Year start-up founded
Year of Series A financing
Pre-Series A employment
First year revenues ($M)
# Patent applications as of 12/31/2000
# Patent grants as of 12/31/2000
Internet industry
Computer industry
Health industry
Communications industry
Massachusetts-based start-up
California-based start-up

Single offer
mean
1997.19
1998.53
9.32
0.23
4.94
1.21
0.48
0.24
0.09
0.11
0.72
0.13

Multiple offer
mean
1997.77
1998.86
11.59
0.35
6.28
1.14
0.59
0.20
0.10
0.10
0.78
0.12

t-stat for equal means
-1.36
-1.18
-1.31
-0.86
-0.62
0.11
-1.26
0.54
-0.12
0.26
-0.79
0.26

Panel D. Comparison of VC characteristics across offers received subsamples
Variable
Pre-money valuation ($M)
High industry deal experience
High normalized funds
High network resources rating
Corporate VC
Angel investor
Financing offered ($M)
Equity taken threshold

Single offer
mean
8.87
0.25
0.64
0.39
0.05
0.22
4.33
0.53
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Multiple offer
mean
17.73
0.51
0.67
0.55
0.02
0.08
7.27
0.61

t-stat for equal
means
-2.75***
-3.35***
-0.29
-1.89*
-2.93***
2.25**
-2.43**
-0.90

Table II
Descriptive Statistics of the Multiple Offers Sample
This table provides descriptive statistics of variables used in Tables III through VIII. The measure VC offer accepted
is a dummy equal to 1 if an offer was accepted by the entrepreneur. The measure pre-money valuation is the product
of the number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before the financing round (in
$M). The measure relative valuation offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest
offered valuation received by that start-up. The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC
above the sample median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with
lower values indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation among offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The
measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds (excluding buyout
funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the sample median. The measure high network
resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least
one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and
suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the number of boards of
directors per general venture capital partner. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a
corporate VC. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel
investor or angel group. The measure financing offered is the amount of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The
measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity
(the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer.

Variable
Dependent variables
VC offer accepted
Pre-money valuation
Relative valuation offered
VC reputation measures
High industry deal experience
Industry reputation rank
High normalized funds raised
High network resources rating
Boards per general partner
VC- and financing term controls
Corporate VC
Angel investor
Financing offered
Equity taken threshold

Mean

Std. Dev.

Source

0.345
20.589
0.826

0.477
32.935
0.215

MIT Survey
MIT Survey
MIT Survey

0.439
5.905
0.568
0.432
4.198

0.498
1.163
0.497
0.497
2.405

Venture Economics
MIT Survey
Venture Economics
MIT Survey
Venture Economics

0.048
0.068
7.863
0.520

0.214
0.253
8.944
0.501

Corporate web sites
MIT Survey
MIT Survey
MIT Survey
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Table III
Pair-wise Correlation Matrix
This table provides a pair-wise correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Statistically significant relationships at the 5% level are denoted
with an asterisk (*). The measure VC offer accepted is a dummy equal to 1 if an offer was accepted by the entrepreneur. The measure pre-money valuation is the
product of the number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before the financing round (in $M). The measure relative valuation
offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered valuation received by that start-up. The measure high industry deal
experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the
sample median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with lower values indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation
among offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds
(excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the sample median. The measure high network resources rating is a
dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources:
Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the number of
boards of directors per general venture capital partner. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure angel investor
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel investor or angel group. The measure financing offered is the level of capital offered (in $M)
by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the median of the
sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer.

(1) VC offer accepted
(2) Pre-money valuation
(3) Relative valuation offered
(4) High industry deal exp.
(5) Industry rep. rank
(6) High norm. funds raised
(7) High network res. rating
(8) Boards per gen. partner
(9) Corporate VC
(10) Angel investor
(11) Financing offered
(12) Equity taken threshold

(1)
1
-0.05
0.05
0.13
0.43*
0.15
0.17*
0.12
-0.32*
-0.10
-0.05
0.13

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1
0.40*
0.26*
-0.22*
-0.25*
0.27*
0.10
0.02
-0.17*
0.73*
-0.22*

1
0.03
-0.04
-0.03
-0.09
-0.06
0.02
-0.04
0.21*
-0.08

1
0.12
-0.21*
0.08
0.46*
-0.07
-0.24*
0.15
0.11

1
0.06
0.07
0.25*
-0.06
-0.05
-0.17*
0.24*

1
-0.06
0.01
-0.06
0.24*
-0.26*
-0.07

1
0.05
-0.07
-0.02
0.33*
0.03

1
-0.23*
-0.21
-0.02
0.17

1
-0.06
-0.10
-0.10

1
-0.19*
-0.23*

1
0.09

1
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Table IV
Univariate Difference in Means Tests
Panel A describes difference in means tests for accepted versus declined financing offers among offers received by
start-ups with more than one Series A financing offer. The measure pre-money valuation is the product of the
number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before the financing round (in $M). The
measure normalized industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has
previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment per years of operation places the VC above the sample
median. The measure normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds
(excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per number of years of operation places the VC above the sample
median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of seven being first best, with lower values
indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation in the start-up’s industrial segment among received offers, as rated by
the entrepreneur. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the
maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources:
Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. Panel B describes
conditional means of relative valuation offered, the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest
offered valuation received by that start-up, and equality of means tests for the upper and lower halves (divided at the
median) of normalized industry deal experience, normalized funds raised, industry reputation rank, and high
network resources rating.

Panel A: Difference in means tests
Pre-money valuation
Normalized industry deal exp.
Normalized funds raised
Industry reputation rank
High network resources rating

Offer accepted
17.733
3.844
0.667
6.588
0.549

Offer not accepted
22.090
2.810
0.515
5.546
0.371

t-stat: equal means
0.764
-1.282
-1.771*
-5.711***
-2.093**

Panel B: Conditional means of relative valuation offered
Top half
0.812
Relative valuation offered

0.820
0.798
0.804

Bottom half
t-stat: equal means
Normalized industry deal exp.
0.844
0.880
Normalized VC funds raised
0.834
0.397
Industry reputation rank
0.843
1.233
High network resources rating
0.842
1.070

*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
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Table V
VC Offer Acceptance Logit Regressions
This table shows start-up fixed-effects logit regressions on a sample of 148 offers across 51 start-ups receiving
multiple Series A financing offers. Regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses below.
The dependent variable, VC offer accepted equals 1 if a financing offer was taken and 0 otherwise. The measure
high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in
the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The measure relative valuation
offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered valuation received by that
start-up. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum
Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting
resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure angel investor
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate
VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure L financing offered is the natural logarithm of
capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing
offer.

Independent
Variables
High industry deal
experience
High network resources
rating
Relative valuation offered

Dependent variable = VC offer accepted
N = 148 observations
(5-1)
(5-2)
(5-3)
1.080**
(0.512)

1.168**
(0.532)
0.606
(0.887)

Angel investor
Corporate VC
L financing offered
Equity taken threshold

1.068**
(0.556)
1.415***
(0.519)
2.157
(1.425)
0.558
(0.799)
-0.450
(0.972)
-0.329
(0.593)
1.015
(0.851)
Yes

Start-up fixed-effects

Yes

Yes

Prob>chi2

0.028

0.070

0.016

-49.195

-48.962

-42.974

Log likelihood

** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% or 1% level, respectively.
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Table VI
Valuation Regressions
This table shows the result of start-up fixed-effects OLS regressions on a sample of 148 offers across 51 start-ups
receiving multiple Series A financing offers. The unit of observation is an offer to a start-up. Robust standard errors
(adjusted for clustering by start-up firm) are reported (in parentheses). The dependent variable is relative valuation
offered, the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered valuation received by that startup. The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has
previously funded in the target start-up's industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The measure
VC offer accepted equals 1 if a financing offer was taken and 0 otherwise. The measure high network resources
rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the
following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or
contacts with investment bankers. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is
from an angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate
VC. The measure L financing offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure
equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the
median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer.

Independent
Variables
High industry deal
experience
High network resources
rating
VC offer accepted

Dependent variable = Relative valuation offered
N = 148 observations
(6-1)
(6-2)
(6-3)
-0.135**
(0.057)

-0.144**
(0.060)
0.026
(0.050)

Angel investor
Corporate VC
L financing offered
Equity taken threshold
Start-up fixed-effects

Yes

Constant

0.885***
(0.025)
0.098

Adj. R-Squared

Yes
0.880***
(0.027)
0.094

** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% or 1% level, respectively.
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-0.098***
(0.036)
-0.048
(0.045)
0.041
(0.032)
-0.021
(0.084)
0.016
(0.110)
0.261***
(0.054)
-0.291***
(0.067)
Yes
0.632***
(0.090)
0.460

Table VII
Offer Acceptance Robustness Regressions
This table reports robustness checks on VC offer acceptance regressions. Fixed effects logit regressions of VC offer accepted, a dummy equal
to 1 if an offer was accepted by the entrepreneur, on the sample of multiple offers are found in columns 1 to 3. The measure high industry
deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment
places the VC above the sample median. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior
funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the sample median. The measure industry
reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with lower values indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation among offers
received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum
Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: recruiting resources, contacts with
customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the average number of boards of
directors per general venture capital partner. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel
investor or angel group. The measure relative valuation offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered
valuation received by that start-up. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure L financing
offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. Columns 4 and 5
show start-up fixed-effects Heckman sample selection probits on the entire sample of 246 offers across 149 start-ups receiving Series A
financing offers. A first stage selection (probit) equation determines the likelihood that a start-up receives multiple financing offers (multiple
offer). The estimated covariates are: L initial employees, the natural logarithm of the pre-Series A number of start-up employees; zero
patents, a dummy equal to 1 if the start-up does not have assigned patents; and dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the following
industrial segments: Internet (infrastructure, retail, and service), health sciences (biotechnology and medical devices), and computers
(software and hardware). Dummies for years of Series A investment (1998, 1999, and 2000) are also included. The term rho is the correlation
between error terms of the selection and primary equations; lamba is the inverse Mill’s ratio.

Dependent variable = VC offer accepted

Independent variables

(7-1)

FE Logits
Multiple-offers sample (N = 148)
(7-2)
(7-3)

High industry deal experience
High normalized funds raised

1.070**
(0.555)

Boards per general
partner
Relative valuation offered
Angel investor
Corporate VC
L financing offered
Equity taken threshold
Log likelihood

0.328***
(0.120)

0.287**
(0.119)

0.725*
(0.437)

Industry reputation rank
High network resources rating

FE Heckman linear prob models
Entire sample (N = 246)
(7-4)
(7-5)

1.428***
(0.518)
1.049
(1.360)
0.536
(0.792)
-0.614
(0.920)
-0.009
(0.574)
0.778
(0.840)
-43.522

1.097***
(0.312)
1.072***
(0.547)
4.012**
(1.779)
1.314
(0.864)
-0.795
(1.137)
-1.242*
(0.757)
1.453
(1.127)
-35.754

0.375***
(0.104)
0.000
(0.001)
1.673
(1.385)
0.642
(0.811)
-0.395
(0.969)
-0.370
(0.600)
1.230
(0.800)
-47.197

Rho

-249.406
-0.000
(1.630)
-0.000
(0.735)

Lambda

0.499*
(0.277)
0.200
(0.186)
-0.051
(0.186)
-0.039
(0.113)
0.220
(0.154)
-240.326
-0.109
(0.709)
-0.046
(0.304)

*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Heckman first stage (selection) equation (SE in parentheses): Multiple offer = - 0.262 (0.356) + 0.147 (0.108) L init. emp. –
0.461 (0.208) Zero patents + 0.663 (0.251) Internet industry + 0.278 (0.362) Health science industry + 0.315 (0.288)
Computer industry – 0.199 (0.303) Year 1998 – 0.080 (0.266) Year 1999 + 0.292 (0.262) Year 2000
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Table VIII
Valuation Robustness Regressions
This table reports robustness checks on relative valuation offered, the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered
valuation received by that start-up. Fixed effects OLS analysis (with robust standard errors) on the sample of multiple offers is reported in
columns 1 to 3. The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously
funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The term high normalized funds raised is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the
sample median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with lower values indicating lower
reputation) of VC reputation among offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The measure VC offer accepted, a dummy equal to 1 if an
offer was accepted by the entrepreneur. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the
maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting resources,
contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the number of boards
of directors per general venture capital partner. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an
angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure L financing
offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. Columns 4 and 5
show start-up fixed effects Heckman sample selection probits on the entire sample of 246 offers across 149 start-ups receiving Series A
financing offers. A first stage selection (probit) equation determines the likelihood that a start-up receives multiple financing offers (multiple
offer). The estimated covariates are: L initial employees, the natural logarithm of the pre-Series A number of start-up employees; zero
patents, a dummy equal to 1 if the start-up does not have assigned patents; and dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the following
industrial segments: Internet (infrastructure, retail, and service), health sciences (biotechnology and medical devices), and computers
(software and hardware). Dummies for years of Series A investment (1998, 1999, and 2000) are also included. The term rho is the correlation
between error terms of the selection and primary equations; lamba is the inverse Mill’s ratio.
Dependent variable = Relative valuation offered

Independent variables

(8-1)

FE OLS regressions
Multiple-offers sample (N = 148)
(8-2)
(8-3)

High industry deal experience
High normalized funds raised

-0.073*
(0.039)

Boards per general
partner
VC offer accepted
Angel investor
Corporate VC
L financing offered
Equity taken threshold
Constant
Adj. R squared/LL

-0.135***
(0.044)

-0.098***
(0.034)

0.061
(0.042)

Industry reputation rank
High network resources rating

FE Heckmans
Entire sample (N = 246)
(8-4)
(8-5)

-0.056
(0.053)
0.056
(0.035)
0.114
(0.162)
0.024
(0.093)
0.355***
(0.082)
-0.290***
(0.074)
0.370***
(0.132)
0.593

-0.041**
(0.018)
-0.038
(0.047)
0.046*
(0.034)
-0.044
(0.083)
0.029
(0.114)
0.276***
(0.050)
-0.283***
(0.071)
0.793***
(0.148)
0.471

-0.048
(0.031)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.031
(0.033)
-0.064
(0.072)
-0.014
(0.112)
0.287***
(0.046)
-0.306***
(0.065)
0.555***
(0.071)
0.497

Rho

0.041*
(0.024)
-0.021
(0.054)
0.016
(0.055)
0.261***
(0.028)
-0.291***
(0.039)
-100.045
0.000
(0.677)
0.000
(0.111)

Lambda

-57.314
-0.000
(0.960)
-0.000
(0.118)

*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Heckman first stage (selection) equation (SE in parentheses): Multiple offer = - 0.262 (0.356) + 0.147 (0.108) L init. emp. – 0.461
(0.208) Zero patents + 0.663 (0.251) Internet industry + 0.278 (0.362) Health science industry + 0.315 (0.288) Computer industry –
0.199 (0.303) Year 1998 – 0.080 (0.266) Year 1999 + 0.292 (0.262) Year 2000
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Table IX
Cross-Sectional Regressions
This table reports OLS regressions, and is based on a sample of accepted Series A financing offers of 149 start-ups.
The unit of observation is an offer to a start-up. The dependent variable is L pre-money valuation, the natural
logarithm of the product of the number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before
the financing round (in $M). The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up's industrial segment places the VC above the
sample median in this category. The measure boards per general partner is the number of boards of directors per
general venture capital partner. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is
from an angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate
VC. The measure L financing offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure
equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the
median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. The measure L initial employees is the natural log
of the number of employees prior to receiving the Series A round. The measure zero patents is a dummy equal to 1
if the start-up does not have assigned patents. The measure industry effects represent a collection of indicator
variables for the Internet (infrastructure, retail, and service), health sciences (biotechnology and medical devices),
and computers (software and hardware) sectors (the communications industry is the excluded industry segment).
Years of Series A investment dummies (1998, 1999, and 2000) are also included.

Independent variables

Dependent variable =
L pre-money valuation
(9-2)

(9-1)

(9-3)

VC characteristics
High industry deal experience

0.478***
(0.145)

0.425***
(0.132)

0.058
(0.081)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.033
(0.113)
-0.056
(0.173)
0.663***
(0.039)
-0.753***
(0.072)

0.514***
(0.081)
-0.223
(0.154)
Yes

0.189***
(0.050)
-0.165**
(0.083)
Yes

0.028
(0.215)
0.263
(0.194)
0.466**
(0.197)
0.828***
(0.253)
0.338

-0.157
(0.116)
-0.075
(0.105)
0.061
(0.107)
1.563***
(0.162)
0.820

Boards per general partner
Angel investor
Corporate VC
L financing offered
Equity taken threshold
Start-up characteristics
L initial employees
Zero patents
Industry effects
Year 1998
Year 1999
Year 2000
Constant
R-squared

1.959***
(0.084)
0.070

*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
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